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Abstract
From 1997 to 1999 and 2003 to the present, Major League Baseball has had a luxury tax
on high payroll teams. This paper analyzes the impact of the tax as a budget constraint on teams’
ability to reward and retain high performing players. In contrast to other papers, we use wins
above replacement (WAR), a popular sabermetrics statistic, to measure performance. Using this
metric, we quantify the number of top performers, how this performance is rewarded with salary,
and how salary impacts players’ mobility decisions. We conclude that when using WAR, the
distribution of performance is not heavy tailed and rather follows an exponential distribution.
Our results suggest that there are fewer top performers in periods with a luxury tax/budget
constraint. We use efficiency wage theory to understand this decrease in top performers as the
result of a decrease in motivators. We understand two different mechanisms of motivating
performance: (1) under a stochastic budget constraint, managers did not choose to extend the
contracts of top players; and (2) under a fixed budget constraint, managers decreased the
monetary reward for an increase in performance. Both these mechanisms decrease the motivation
for top talent to perform highly.
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I.

Introduction
Human capital is one of the most important resources that a firm possesses. In 2016, 44%

of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) consisted of salaries and wages.1 However, even this
number fails to capture the entrepreneurial capital that business owners invest in a firm that also
drives profit. In a global survey of CEOs by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 72% of CEOs claimed that
they were concerned about the availability of necessary talent (PwC, 2016). Harvard Business
Review interviewed CEOs in 2013 and talent management was their top concern (Groysberg, et
al., 2015). In addition to this scarcity, a main challenge of human capital management is that
individuals can leave a firm at any time and take their human capital with them. This loss of
capital is one reason turnover can be very costly to firms—especially in the cost of training new
hires. These trends make talent retention highly important to firm success. Salary is the main
reason that employees consider leaving a firm (Ramlall, 2003), but firms have budget constraints
which dictate how much they can allocate to talent retention and salary. We analyze the
challenge of firms to reward top performers in a manner that fits their budget constraints and
retains top talent.
Access to data makes studying the retention of top performers difficult, if not entirely
impossible: private companies protect their own performance data as highly confidential. One
exception is professional sports where performance data is readily available. We choose to focus
on professional baseball, Major League Baseball (MLB), for two main reasons. First,
performance in MLB is relatively independent of other players’ performance with mainly the
pitcher and batter interacting with each other. In more interdependent sports, the performance
statistics of any one player incorporates how well the entire team works together as well as the

1

FRED, Compensation of Employees/GDP: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=2Xa. Accessed April, 2017.
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talent of that individual—this interdependency makes it challenging to track individual
performance. Second, the league has had an additional budget constraint placed on teams in the
last two decades in the form of a luxury tax. We exploit this change in regulation to see how
talent retention strategy depends on budget.
MLB enacts a tax on each dollar spent on payroll over a certain threshold, called a luxury
tax. MLB has had two different tax regimes in place, one from 1997 to 1999 (referred to as the
1996 luxury tax, named for the year it was approved) and another from 2003 to the present
(referred to as the 2002 luxury tax, similarly named). Under the 1996 luxury tax, MLB taxed the
5 teams with the highest payrolls for each dollar spent over the midpoint of the 5th and 6th highest
payroll. Under the 2002 luxury tax, MLB taxes teams above a certain predetermined cap. The
most salient difference between the two tax regimes is the absolute payroll level after which a
team faces the tax under the 2002 luxury tax (instead of one which depends on the payroll level
of other teams as with the 1996 luxury tax). For the 2014 to 2016 seasons, the threshold was
$189 million.2 Further, the 2002 measure increases the tax percentage for repeat offenders. In
2016, the luxury tax was amended to include surcharges for the magnitude by which a team
violates the cap.3 In the 2015 season, four teams were in violation: the Los Angeles Dodgers, the
New York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, and the San Francisco Giants. In the 2016 season, the
four teams were joined by the Detroit Tigers and the Chicago Cubs. In 2015, the highest
spending team in MLB, the Los Angeles Dodgers, spent over $305 million on their roster. In

2

MLB Glossary, Competitive Balance Tax: http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/competitive-balance-draft-picks.
Accessed October 2016.
3
ESPN, Coverage of the 2016 Competitive Balance Agreement:
http://www.espn.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/76736/how-luxury-tax-penalties-would-work-on-baseballs-biggestpayrolls. Accessed March, 2017.
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contrast, the lowest spending team, the Miami Marlins, spent only $67.5 million—22% of the
highest payroll.4
We use this luxury tax to study the following question: how do firm level decisions
around using compensation as a tool to retain top talent change under this additional budget
constraint? In this paper, we analyze the impact of the two different luxury taxes on the
distribution of performance, compensation, and the ability of teams to retain top talent. Key to
the decisions around compensation strategy are assumptions about the distribution of
performance—specifically, what percent of a firm’s labor force is top talent? This question
addresses the overarching question of what is the distribution of performance and how heavily
populated is the upper tail of the distribution. Previous literature has demonstrated the connection
between pay and performance (Bloom, 1999; Debrock et al., 2004; Bruenig et al., 2014; Tao et
al., 2016) and specifically, the ability of salary to motivate workers under efficiency wage theory
(Yellen, 1995; Akerlof, 1984; Stiglitz, 1976). When considering MLB’s luxury tax, the taxes’
impact on how teams use salary to motivate players may also impact performance. In this paper,
we use wins above replacements (WAR)—a measure of the marginal impact of each player
explained extensively in our methodology section—to measure performance instead of the more
traditionally used vector of different performance metrics. As we will explain further, we believe
WAR provides a measure of performance that more accurately measures the marginal
contribution of a player as well as facilitates comparison across seasons and teams.
While baseball has the advantage of having easily accessible performance data as
mentioned earlier, not all data is easily accessible. One of our largest limitations is the lack of
data on salary, particularly for players with low WARs. We also were not able to get a cohesive

4

Spotrac, MLB 2017 Payroll Tracker: http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/payroll/2015/. Accessed September, 2016.
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dataset on which players were under contracts, for what length and what the terms of those
contracts were. Despite the data limitations, we still believe our work meaningfully contributes
to the literature about luxury taxes in professional sports and more generally, budget constraints
in talent management. There has been no empirical research on the impact of MLB’s luxury tax
on performance and pay. The theoretical work (Marburger, 1997; Dietl et al., 2009) has used tax
regimes that are dissimilar from the one in place in MLB, as discussed in our literature review.
We use the following models to understand how teams use salary to reward top
performers and how the ability of teams to retain top talent has changed. We look at the
empirical survival function of performance as well as log and semi-log plots in four distinct
phases: (1) 1985 to 1996, before any luxury tax was imposed; (2) 1997 to 1999, when the 1996
luxury tax was in place; (3) 2000 to 2002, when the league again did not have a luxury tax; (4)
2003 to 2015, when the 2002 luxury tax was in place. We also run a regression of salary against
performance as well as a probit model of player retention explained by compensation.
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows: first, we provide background
information on MLB’s rationale for the luxury tax and the probability theory that we will use in
this paper. Second, we overview the current literature to explain the context of our work in both
personnel and sports economics. Third, we give an overview of our model and methodology.
Fourth, we present the data and the results as well as discuss the economic significance of our
findings. We conclude by discussing our contribution to the literature as well as areas of further
research.

8

II.

Background Information
i. History of the Luxury Tax
Sport leagues such as MLB have a unique challenge in maintaining what is referred to as

“competitive balance”— firms want their teams to be strong because of the increased revenue
from a strong fan base and apparel and ticket sales but firms also want other teams to be strong
so that games do not get boring and tickets sales will continue. Forrest and Simmons (2002)
demonstrated this phenomena in English soccer—as the uncertainty of who will win a game
increased, ticket sales increased as well. Schreyer et al. (2016) confirmed this finding in German
soccer—an increase in uncertainty led to more ticket sales and people staying at stadiums longer
(and perhaps purchasing more commodities). MLB has tried to establish competitive balance in
multiple ways, most recently with the luxury tax that is the focus of this paper and previously,
with the reserve clause.
Professional baseball in the U.S. started in 1869 and by the late 1870’s, team owners
were already discussing the problem of roster jumping. Players would get stolen away from
teams and switch teams between seasons. Team owners decided to circulate a list of five players
that they “reserved” from such jumping—by 1883, that list included the entire team and by 1887,
teams were including a reserve clause in contracts (Haupert, 2016). The reserve clause prevented
a free labor market from existing in MLB by preventing players’ from choosing their teams. As
Rottenberg (1956) concluded in his seminal paper, the reserve clause transferred wealth from
players to team owners. Not surprisingly, players were dissatisfied with the reserve clause and
made multiple retaliation attempts (Haupert, 2016). Success came in 1976 when MLB and the
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) agreed that players who had more than 6

9

years of major league experience had the right to solicit contracts at the end of a season—this
right became known as free agency (Villanova, 2016).
From 1976 on, owners attempted to limit free agency and salary growth—after all, it just
increased the cost of owning a team. The tension between owners and the MLBPA ultimately
culminated in the 1994 strike which lasted for 232 days, canceling 900 games and the 1994
World Series.5 Largely in response to the strike, MLB passed the 1996 Competitive Balance
Agreement (CBA). Part of this agreement was the luxury tax—in the 1997, 1998, and 1999
seasons, the five teams with the highest payrolls were taxed 35% (in 1997 and 1998) or 34% (in
1999) for every dollar above the average of the fifth and sixth highest payrolls. Calculating the
total payroll for a given season is complicated and includes the team’s contribution to the leaguewide player benefits (which is split evenly between the teams), the annual salary of players on
the roster for the entire season, and the portion of long term contracts attributed to that year
(Dosh, 2007).
Despite the 1996 CBA, the Yankees made it to the World Series four consecutive times
from 1998 to 2001, winning 3 of the 4 titles (Barbosa, 2015). While this is not necessarily
evidence that the 1996 luxury tax was ineffective at maintaining competitive balance, it was
largely interpreted as such. As the opportunity to renew the 1996 CBA came and passed without
action, the 2000 to 2002 seasons passed with no luxury tax in effect. In 2002, MLB reintroduced
a luxury tax in the 2002 CBA, now dubbed the competitive balance tax. The 2002 luxury tax’s
largest difference from that of the 1996 CBA was establishing a fixed salary cap rather than one
dependent on team payrolls. The cap in 2003 was $117 million and in 2020 will reach $206

5

Sports Illustrated article: https://www.si.com/mlb/2014/08/12/1994-strike-bud-selig-orel-hershiser. Accessed
November, 2016.
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million.6 The 2002 CBA also set up a progressive tax scheme under which repeat offenders faced
an increased tax rate. Though the exact rates have changed with the renewals of the 2002 CBA,
first time offenders face a rate between 17.5 to 22.5%, second time offenders 30%, third time
offenders 40% and since 2012, fourth time offenders face 50%. As of the 2017 season, teams
will face an additional penalty for the magnitude by which they violate the cap—for being $20
million to $40 million over the threshold, 12%; $40 million over, 40%; and the second time
being $40 million over, 45%.3 These tax rates are additional to the tax rates for just being in
violation of the luxury tax payroll cap. Some have accused the 2002 CBA of allocating an
increasing share of revenue away from players and to owners (Grow, 2015) similar to the
accusations of the reserve clause by Rottenberg (1956).
In the 2015 season, the Los Angeles Dodgers paid $43.7 million under the luxury tax, the
highest penalty ever paid in the tax’s history (Nightengale, 2015). The New York Yankees have
paid the tax for every year the tax has been in place and account for over $297 million of the
$403 million of tax revenue from 2003 to 2015.7,8 None of the teams that paid the tax in the 2015
season (Los Angeles Dodgers, New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and San Francisco Giants)
made it to the World Series. However, the World Series winners in 2016, the Chicago Cubs, did
pay the tax in the same season and were the fifth highest payroll in the league.9 Contrary to the
1996 CBA, it seems that high payroll teams are not necessarily also top performing teams under
the 2002 CBA.

6

These are nominal values; MLB Competitive Balance Agreement, effective 2012 to 2016:
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. Accessed October, 2016.
7
Data on luxury tax payments from Forbes article: https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/03/breakingdown-over-400-million-in-mlb-luxury-tax-penalties-since-2003/#3beca803541a. Accessed November, 2016.
8
Even though the owner of the Yankees, Steinbrenner, was one of the largest opponents of the 2002 CBA and the
only owner to vote against it (Dosh, 2007), he has since announced that the Yankees aim to get its payroll below the
luxury tax threshold (Hawkins, 2015).
9
USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2016/12/16/apnewsbreak-record-6-mlb-teams-to-payluxury-tax/95536006/. Accessed March, 2017.
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Teams can and do exploit the requirement for 6 years of experience in the major leagues
before being granted free agent status. One recent example is Kris Bryant who was sent down to
the minor leagues at the beginning of the 2015 season by the Chicago Cubs. This move allowed
the Cubs to retain Bryant for an additional season without having to enter salary negotiations
because he would be just shy of 6 years of major league experience at the end of the 2020
season. Bryant went on to be recognized as National League Rookie of the Year in same season
(2015) and MVP in the National League in the following season (2016), the same year the Cubs
won the World Series. This practice in MLB demonstrates that teams are concerned at retaining
top talent at a minimal cost to the team. Recently, the MLBPA has threatened litigation,
presumably finding these moves to not be in the best interest of the player’s earning potential
whereas MLB claims that these moves are in the discretion of a team’s ability to decide their
roster.10 The MLBPA and the owners are clearly still in conflict over what is permissible to curb
salary growth.
ii. Probability Theory
In our paper, we will use distribution theory to analyze the likelihood of high performers
in different periods of the luxury tax. Here, we review some of the foundations of distribution
theory and the relevant distributions that we will discuss and compare. The cornerstone of
distribution theory is a random variable, a function from a sample space to the real numbers. For
example, for a coin toss, the event of getting heads can be represented as 1 and the event of
getting tails as 0. For a random variable X, we define the cumulative distribution function (cdf)
as 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑷(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥) where 𝑷 is a probability measure with range [0,1]. In layman’s term, the
cdf looks at the probability that a random variable is less than or equal to a particular value

10

Fox Sports coverage of the trade: http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/chicago-cubs-kris-bryant-javier-baezaddison-russell-sent-down-to-minor-leagues-033015.
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(represented by 𝑥 in the definition). Since we are interested in high performers, we find it more
useful to define a survival function, the probability that a random variable is greater than a
particular value. Formally, we define the survival function as 𝑦(𝑥) = 𝑷(𝑋 > 𝑥) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑥).
Looking at the survival function allows us to focus on the right tail of the distribution which
contains the highest performers without our analysis being impacted by random variation and/or
outliers in the rest of our dataset.
Specifically, we will look at whether our dataset has a heavy tail. A random variable X is
said to be heavy tailed if it has an absolute moment that is infinite (∃ 𝑛 > 0: 𝐸|𝑋|𝑛 = ∞). The
heavier a tail, the more likely it is to find observations in the tail and hence, in our situation, the
higher abundance of top performers. One of the most common examples of a heavy tailed
distribution is the Pareto distribution,11 𝑷(𝑋 > 𝑥) = 𝐶𝑥 −𝑎 for x > 0, a constant C, and parameter
𝑎. Some common uses of Pareto distributions are to model city sizes, incomes, and the
magnitude of earthquakes (Krishnan, 2006). Figure 1 shows a Pareto distribution for 𝑎 ∈
{1,2,10}.

11

The Pareto distribution is also commonly referred to as the Power Law distribution because of its functional form.
The discrete version of the Pareto distribution is called the Zipf distribution.
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Figure 1. Probability Density of Pareto Distribution for 𝒂 ∈ {𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟏𝟎}

In comparison to the Pareto distribution, the exponential and normal distributions are
both light tailed (∀𝑛 > 0: 𝐸|𝑋|𝑛 < ∞). The survival function of an exponential distribution is
𝑷(𝑋 > 𝑥) = 𝑒 −𝜆𝑥 for 𝑥 > 0 and parameter λ. An intuitive manner to think about the exponential
distribution is that if one is at a particular value, say m, the probability of decreasing from m is
larger than the probability of increasing from m. Figure 2 shows an exponential distribution for
𝜆 ∈ {1,2,10}.

14

Figure 2. Probability Density of Exponential Distribution for 𝝀 ∈ {𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟏𝟎}

Perhaps the distribution that economists use mostly widely is the normal (or Gaussian)
distribution. By the Central Limit Theorem, under some general conditions, the sum of random
variables with a general distribution converges to a normal. Figure 3 shows the right tail of the
Pareto distribution (for 𝑎 = 1), exponential (for 𝜆 = 1), and normal (for 𝜇 = 0 , 𝜎 = 1). As one
can see, the Pareto distribution has a heavy tail while both the exponential and normal
distributions have light tails—though, the tail of the normal distribution is significantly lighter
than that of the exponential. We will consider each of these distributions as potential underlying
distributions for performance later in this paper.

15

Figure 3. Tails of Pareto, Exponential and Normal Distributions

III.

Literature Review
In looking at how the change in the luxury tax has impacted player performance and

ultimately, player mobility in MLB, our literature review focuses on a few central areas: the
relationship and dispersion of pay and performance, how pay impacts turnover decisions, and the
impact of luxury taxes and salary caps on pay and performance. We consider both personnel
economics and sports economics as well as relevant research from the fields of mathematics and
organizational psychology.
The literature provides multiple rationales for the existence of heavy tails in performance
including both market and job characteristics. Ultimately, heavy tails mean that there are more
“super stars”—individual workers or firms whose performance far exceeds their peers—than
under light tailed distributions such as the normal. In a theoretical framework, Rosen (1981)
explained the existence of “super stars” at a firm level as a result of market conditions that allow
firms to capitalize on decreasing costs per unit of output. Mizuno et al. (2012) applied a more
16

mathematical approach showing that firm productivity in 30 countries followed a Pareto
distribution with a heavy tail instead of a normal—additionally, the heaviness of the tail varied
by industry. O’Boyle and Aguinis (2012) studied five different industries including professional
sports and demonstrated that a Pareto distribution was a more likely distribution than a normal
for individual performance. Aguinis and O’Boyle (2014) confirmed these findings. Aguinis et al.
(2016) narrowed down characteristics such as job autonomy and job complexity that are
correlated with a heavier tail in the power law distributions of individual performance. Crawford
(2012) urged that common conceptions of personnel psychology and economics be revisited in
the light of the “myth of normality”. This pervasiveness in research of Pareto distributions causes
a challenge for organizational researchers and economists since most statistical training has
focused on normally distributed statistics (Andriani and McKelvey, 2009).
In a review of the current literature on performance and productivity, Syverson (2011)
called for further research into the impacts of the heavy tail distribution of performance.
Specifically, Syverson calls for research into how heavy tails impact firms’ decisions to invest in
projects. In the context of baseball, signing a contract with a player can be viewed as an
investment. While teams can trade players during the season, signing a player who ends up being
a low performer means less leverage in a trade than a player who was signed cheap and now
performs highly. When teams sign new players, they have imperfect knowledge of a player’s
performance. If the player has played in the league, the firm knows previous performance but not
how that performance will change. In the case of a rookie player, the team must rely on
performance in a similar, though different situation such as college or the minor leagues.
Longley and Wong (2011) find that prior performance metrics in the minor leagues are poor
performance indicators of pitchers once they reach the major league indicating that experience in
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MLB may be most pertinent in predicting future performance. Again, the firm faces uncertainty
as to whether that performance will continue from the minor to major league. This process is
similar to most industries where firms rely on observable employee characteristics until they can
observe actual on-the-job performance and are able to make more educated pay changes (Lazear
and Oyer, 2009). However, MLB managers are able to observe new players actually playing
baseball (though perhaps in a different league/environment), and therefore have an advantage in
determining compensation as compared to most other industries where managers must use
proxies such as education.
But, does pay dispersion also impacts performance? This question is another one which
the literature has addressed. Outside the field of sport economics, research has demonstrated that
pay dispersion can cause an increase in effort and in turn, performance (Lazear, 2000; Shaw et
al., 2002; Shaw, 2014). Lazear (2000) further added on his previous research by showing that
changing to a pay-for-performance structure increased overall firm productivity. While Lazear
addressed some questions about the relationship between performance and pay structure, Abowd
et al. (1999) confirmed that higher wages did indeed lead to higher productivity.12
Some of the literature supports an argument against pay dispersion and for pay
compression. Lazear (1989, 1991) demonstrated that evenly distributed pay increases
cooperation and ultimately, productive efficiency. Perhaps because cooperation is so important
in sports, sports economics has largely found a negative correlation between pay dispersion and
performance. Harder (1992) found that the pay-for-performance strategy in basketball and
baseball significantly decreased cooperation, specifically of those individuals who were not high
performers. Frick, et al. (2003) compared the impact of intra-team wage disparity on

12

Though perhaps not relevant to my discussion in this paper, Abowd et al. (1999) did find that this increase in
productivity did not always translate to higher profits because of the increased payroll cost.
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performance and concluded that disparity decreased the overall team performance in baseball
(though they found the opposite in basketball and hockey, where the rosters are much smaller).
Borghesi (2008) found that under the National Football League’s (NFL) salary cap, teams that
paid a few players highly (and thus, had a wide pay dispersion) performed worse overall. In both
the National Basketball Association (NBA) and German soccer league, Frey et al. (2013) found a
negative correlation between the relative income position of players and performance. Multiple
studies also corroborate this effect in MLB (Bloom, 1999; Debrock et al., 2004; Breunig et al.,
2014; Tao et al., 2016).
Wang et al. (2014) conducted panel granger tests to investigate the causality between pay
and performance in the Korean Professional Baseball League. They found that causality runs
from the dispersion of pay to team performance but not vice versa. Further, pay dispersion has a
stronger overall causality on team performance than total team payroll implying that paying a
few star players highly was not a successful talent strategy. Tao et al. (2016) used a data set of
MLB from 1985 to 2013. In the dataset, wage disparity negatively correlated with team
performance but the relationship was insignificant when controlling for the overall level of team
payroll. When considering MLB’s luxury tax in light of this research, the taxes’ impact on the
dispersion of pay may be a means by which the tax has impacted performance or even turnover.
When considering leaving a team, a player may be unhappy with his current
compensation and/or be offered a higher compensation from another team. Additional literature
suggests that pay dispersion as well as an individual’s position in the pay structure also impacts
turnover (Pfeffer and Blake-Davis, 1992). Pfeffer and Blake-Davis (1992) find that salary
dispersion negatively impacts turnover. Further, Abbasi and Hollman (2000) theorize that lack of
competitive compensation is a leading cause for turnover along with a lack of recognition for

19

worker achievement. Samuel and Chipunza (2009) analyzed several intrinsic and extrinsic
motivators for turnover and found that salary package is statistically significant in preventing
turnover; however, the duo does not report a magnitude of this correlation leaving the economic
significance in question. Ramlall (2003) found that salary was the second most common reason
for staying with a company (the first was company location) and the most common reason to
contemplating leaving a firm. In Meudell and Rodham’s (1998) research, workers named
benefits, salary, and bonuses as their top three motivators to work and to work harder.
However, high mobility may also impact the salary that players are offered. Vincent and
Eastman (2012) studied the National Hockey League (NHL) and found that frequent team
changes were negatively correlated with salary. They attributed this largely to team specific
knowledge that became essentially worthless when a player switched teams. Glenn, et al. (2001)
studied the impact of team specific knowledge on turnover in MLB from 1990 to 1992. Their
study indicated that certain positions switched teams more frequently and that these positions
tended to be in the outfield where there was less team specific knowledge (compared to the
infield). While there is team specific human capital, Singell (1991) found that the player’s tenure
in the major league was a stronger measure of human capital attained than performance when
looking at which players were offered coaching positions.
Though we will predominately focus on pay in this paper, pay is only one means of
motivating employees—as Lazear and Oyer (2009) commented on in an overview of the
personnel economics literature, there is also significant research around other forms of
motivation and non-monetary compensation. In baseball, specifically, Pedace and Hall (2012)
looked at the wage differentials of risk reducing contract measures. They found evidence of a
monetary tradeoff for the inclusion of a no-trade clause (which limit trades only to when they are
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mutually agreed upon by the team and player), especially when part of long-term contracts.
While logic might also lead one to believe that long term contracts would also lead to a
compensating wage differential, Maxcy (2004) makes the argument that long-term contracts
reduce risk for both the player and the team and because of the shared benefit, there is not a
compensating wage differential for long term contracts.
Measures such as a salary cap or luxury tax may impact the pay decisions of firms and
thus, may also impact performance. Marburger (1997) established a theoretical framework under
which he found that under a uniform luxury tax, overall player salaries would decrease.
However, the luxury tax in MLB is not uniform and further, the rate differs depending on how
many consecutive years a team is in violation since the 2003 season. Dietl et al. (2009) also
studied the luxury tax through a theoretical model. The group found that a luxury tax increases
the total payroll of the league as well as competitive balance. More specifically, their model
resulted in lower payroll teams increasing their payrolls as they hire “star” players that had
previously played for larger payroll teams as these players became too expensive for larger teams
to hold in the presence of the tax. However, the tax in this model also looked very different from
that in place in MLB—all teams that were above the league average faced the tax and the
revenue was redistributed to those teams below the average payroll. In empirical work,
Kowalewski and Leeds (1999, 2001) found that the NFL’s salary cap increased the reward for
performance especially for players that were on the lower end of the pay distribution. Ajilore and
Hendrickson (2007) found that MLB’s luxury tax had the effect of making teams more
competitive but ultimately, teams with higher payrolls still had the most wins.
There has not been empirical research on the impact of MLB’s luxury tax on performance
and pay. The luxury tax in MLB significantly differs from that of Marburger (1997) and Dietl et
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al. (2009). Further, while there has been work around the impact of the tax on the league (Ajilore
and Hendrickson, 2007), the literature has not addressed how the tax impacts the individual
personnel decisions of how much a team pays a player and whether a player chooses to stay at a
specific team or leave. Studying the impact of MLB’s luxury tax on the league mandates a
consideration of how the tax has impacted the ability of teams to retain talent. While ultimately
pay is only one of the means of retaining talent, the literature has shown it to increase
performance specifically in baseball (Debrock et al., 2004). This study contributes to the
literature by tying together considerations about the relationship between the spread of pay and
performance with MLB’s luxury tax and how that has influenced player mobility.
IV.

Methods and Model
All firms need to make pay decisions regarding how much to pay each of their workers for

the value they provide to the firm. These decisions must be made under budget constraints. The
luxury tax imposed on MLB is one such budget constraint. As managers decide on their rosters
for a season and the corresponding payroll of that roster, they must consider how close they are
to the luxury tax cap, after which they must pay the tax. In MLB, there are two types of
managers: General Managers (analogous to the CEO) and Team Managers (who are responsible
for on the field strategy and oversight). We do not make a distinction between the two and
consider both as managers for the purpose of this paper. The luxury tax may be of larger concern
to the managers of certain teams than for others. The amount of concern can be seen as being
caused by two effects: the proximity of the tax and the magnitude of the tax. By the proximity of
the tax, we mean that for a team whose overall budget is far below the luxury tax cap, the luxury
tax will not factor into their decision making as much as teams who have a budget close to the
cap. The magnitude of the tax refers to the tax rate—in the fourth period that we consider in our
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analysis (refer to Table 1), the tax rate increases with the number of years a team has been in
violation.
Our analysis will compare four time periods which each have different luxury tax
regulations. These time periods are described in Table 1. These periods were chosen because
they capture the two different luxury tax regimes that MLB has enacted as well as two control
periods where there was no luxury tax. They also look at a continuous period of time. Arguably
the most significant change in MLB was the advent of free agency in 1976 (Villanova, 2016).
With free agency, players have more control over what teams they play for—after 6 years of play
in the major leagues, players can solicit, negotiate, and sign contracts with any team. This change
increases competition for players and in turn, increases the bargaining power of the players.
Thus, our earliest period starts well after 1976.
Table 1. Time Periods for Analysis
Time Period
Description
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996)
MLB had no luxury tax in place.
(2) 1996 Luxury Tax (1997 to 1999) The 5 teams with the highest payroll had to pay a 34%
tax on every dollar spend above the midpoint of the 5th
and 6th highest teams’ payrolls.
(3) No Regulation II (2000 to 2002)
MLB has no luxury tax in place again.
(4) 2002 Luxury Tax (2003 to 2015) A team is taxed on every dollar spent over a certain
payroll cap. The rate of the tax depends on the number
of times the team has consecutively violated the cap.
The tax rate since 2012 has been 17.5% for first time
offenders, 30% for second time offenders, 40% for
third time offenders, and 50% for fourth time
offenders.

In this section, we will review the general framework for our model as decomposed in three
sections: (i) the number of high performers: an input into salary decisions; (ii) a regression of
salary on performance: the link between performance and salary; and, (iii) a regression of
retention on salary: salary as a tool to retain top talent. The first section addresses how many top
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performers exist in each period. The second, how performance is rewarded through salary. And
the third, how salary impacts talent retention. We compare the 4 periods of analysis (Table 1) to
understand if the answers depend on the luxury tax regime (or lack thereof). Our model assumes
the luxury tax impacts a team’s budget and thus, influences how a team pays players. If a player
faces a lower pay than he might otherwise receive without the luxury tax, he may be more likely
to try to switch teams under free agency.
i. The Number of High Performers: An Input into Salary Decisions
Given her budget, a manager would optimally pay top performers the highest since these top
performers contribute the most to overall team performance. However, a player’s performance
only has significance relative to the performance of other players. A player’s negotiating power
increases with the scarcity of his skill set or ability. Thus, the fewer players that perform as well
or better than a player, the more attractive that player becomes. This analysis raises the question
for managers of what the overall talent landscape looks like and specifically, just how many top
performers there are in a labor market.
We begin our analysis by considering the distribution of performance for each of the four
time periods in Table 1, using random variable 𝑊𝑝 , where 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,3,4} indicates the time
period. 𝑊𝑝 is measured using wins above replacement (WAR), our performance metric. Our
WAR data is from the sabermetrics site, Baseball Reference.13 WAR measures the marginal
contribution of a player and is calculated in two steps: (1) comparing the specific player to the
average player; (2) comparing the average to the replacement.14 The statistic overall compares a
specific player to a replacement player instead of the average player because if a star player

13

WAR data available at: http://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained.shtml. Accessed September,
2016.
14
For a more detailed description of Baseball Reference’s methodology than provided here, please visit its own
methodology description: http://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained.shtml.
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leaves a team or gets injured mid-season, a team will not be able to replace said player with one
who is average since those players will already be under a contract. Rather, a team will normally
need to use what is referred to as a replacement player whose performance is below average and
who is normally from the minor leagues. Thus, a more accurate measure of the marginal impact
of a player is comparing him to this replacement player.
The most recent version of Baseball Reference’s methodology sets the replacement level
at a .294 winning percentage which is a record of 48 wins and 118 losses. The sum of the WAR
of all players on a team and the replacement level should be very close to the winning percentage
of the team for that season. While a scalar metric may seem simple compared to a vector, WAR
is an advanced statistic that considers multiple measures of performance. At a basic level, the
statistic is computed based on runs contributed and avoided by each player. The manner that
Baseball Reference calculates WAR is tailored towards position players and pitchers.
There are 6 components of WAR for position players: (1) Batting Runs, (2) Baserunning
Runs, (3) Runs added or lost due to Grounding in Double Plays, (4) Fielding Runs, (5) Positional
Adjustment Runs, and (6) Replacement Level Runs. For the first 5 components, Baseball
Reference calculates the number of runs attributed to each of these components that a player has
acquired over the course of the season. Afterwards, the runs data is put through a win-loss
estimator software, called PythagenPat, which changes runs to wins in a probalistic manner that
relies on interactions between a player and the entire league. Ten runs roughly lead to one win
(though not always). The simulator translates runs to wins given the environment of the league
for that season. After calculating wins above average (WAA), the statistic is compared to the
replacement level. The replacement level, as previously stated, is a winning percentage of .294.
This leads to 1,000 wins above replacement for the entire league (the product of 30 teams, 162
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games, and the difference between .294 and .500). These wins are divided amongst position
players (59%) and pitchers (41%) based on the salary decomposition of the two groups.
The WAR calculation for pitchers fundamentally has two components: runs allowed and
innings pitched. The complexity in WAR for pitchers is in calculating what an average pitcher
would have done when faced with the same scenario as the specific pitcher for which Baseball
Reference is calculating the WAR. Using game logs, the site considers the opposition that the
pitchers faces in terms of batter, the quality of defense, and park specific factors among others.
The results of this analysis are once again run through the win-loss simulator before being
compared to the replacement level as described for position players.
WAR as a statistic for research has a few advantages: primarily, it consolidates a wide
range of league and player characteristics into one value. As with any aggregation, some of the
detail is lost in the calculation; however, the concision also enables the comparison of players
across different positions, strengths, teams, time periods, and situations. Since our paper analyzes
the overall distribution of performers to understand the number of top performers in a league, the
ability to compare players facilitates this analysis.
We use WAR as a measure of 𝑊𝑝 to build the empirical survival function of performance. A
survival function measures the probability that a random variable is larger than a given value
(refer to Background Information section for more detail). We define our empirical survival
function 𝑦̂ evaluated at dummy variable 𝑥 for performance (random variable 𝑊𝑝 ) with n
observations as follows:
Equation 1

̂ (𝑊𝑝 > 𝑥) =
𝑦̂(𝑥) = 𝑷
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#{𝑖: 𝑊𝑝,𝑖 > 𝑥}
𝑛

Using 𝑦̂, we will analyze the right tail of the distribution. The heavier a tail, the more
likely we are to find observations (in this case, players) who are high performers.
The heavy tail distribution we consider is the Pareto distribution, where for a random
variable X, 𝑷(𝑋 > 𝑥) = 𝐶𝑥 −𝑎 for x > 0, a constant C, and parameter 𝑎. The log of the survival
function is log(𝐶) − 𝑎 log(𝑥). 15 By taking the log, the empirical survival function is equal to the
log of 𝑥 multiplied by a constant16 with a shift factor. Thus, the log-log plot of the empirical
survival function and 𝑥 would be linear. Further, the slope of this line would approximate a.
Such a method was pioneered by Mandelbrot (1963).
In our analysis of the tail of the distribution of W, looking at the Hill estimator and plot
can also be helpful to determine whether the data fits a Pareto distribution. For 𝑋(1) ≤ 𝑋(2) ≤
𝑋(3) ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑋(𝑛) order statistics,17 a can be approximated using linear regression. Specifically,
𝑖

the slope of the line between the points (log (𝑛) , log(𝑋(𝑛−𝑖+1) )) for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑟 approximates
-1/a. Kratz and Resnick (1996) and Schultze and Steinebach (1996) both developed this strategy
independently. The Hill estimator is a popular estimator for the tail of a distribution, below it is
defined with our random variable for performance, 𝑊𝑝 :
Equation 2
𝑟

1
𝐻(𝑟) = ∑(ln(𝑊𝑝,(𝑛−𝑖+1) ) − ln(𝑊𝑝,(𝑛−𝑟+1) ))
𝑟
𝑖=𝑖

The Hill estimator was derived by Hill (1975) as the conditional maximum likelihood estimator
of a based on the r largest order statistics. A Hill plot shows this estimator as a function of the
order statistic and should stabilize for data with an underlying Pareto distribution.

Unless otherwise noted, “log” refers to the natural log.
This constant will be α.
17
How ties are broken is arbitrary.
15
16
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Whether a dataset fits a light tailed distribution can also be analyzed using log-log and
semi-log plots. If random variable X is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation

σ, the density of X is exp(−(𝑥 − 𝜇)2 /2𝜎 2 )/√2𝜎 2 𝜋. Without loss of generality, we can assume
the mean is 0 and variance is 1. The survival function evaluated at 𝑥 will be the integral of this
∞

density from 𝑥 to infinity: ∫𝑥 exp(−𝑠 2 /2)/√2𝜋 𝑑𝑠. We multiply the integrand by 𝑠/𝑥 (which is
∞

∞

greater than or equal to 1 for 𝑠 ≥ 𝑥), to result in ∫𝑥 exp(−𝑠 2 /2)/√2𝜋 𝑑𝑠 ≤ ∫𝑥 𝑠×
𝑠2
2

exp(− )
𝑥√2𝜋

𝑑𝑠 = 𝐶exp(−(𝑥)2 /2) where C is a constant. From taking the log of both sides, the plot

of the log of the survival function against 𝑥 2 should be linear if X is normally distributed. This
type of analysis can be applied to W: the log of the empirical survival function for W evaluated
at dummy variable 𝑥 against 𝑥 2 should be linear if W is normally distributed.
If instead a random variable X is exponentially distributed with parameter λ, the survival
function of X is exp(−𝜆𝑥). The log of the survival function is equal to 𝑥 times a constant equal
to the parameter λ. The semi-log plot of the survival function and 𝑥 will be linear.
From this analysis, we produce a measure of how many top performers there are in the
league in each of the four time periods we study—for the purpose of our work, we define a top
performer as anyone’s who WAR is two standard deviations above the mean of the overall
dataset. This measure will be integrated in our following two models.
ii. A Regression of Salary on Performance: The Link between Performance and Salary
Determining the exact relationship between performance and compensation can be
challenging. Pay can be both a tool to retain top performers and can cause employees to improve
performance (Lazear, 1991). Thus, rather than trying to untangle the interdependencies of this
relationship, our paper focuses on the correlation of performance and compensation. Under
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elementary supply-demand theory, the scarcity or abundance of top performers impacts the
salary of those top performers. Thus, the relative scarcity of a player’s ability is an input into a
manager’s decision on salary. Equation 3 displays our model to examine the relationship
between performance distribution and salary.
Equation 3
2
log(𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽1 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽2 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽3 + 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝛽4 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝛽5

⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖 𝛽10
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖,𝑡 𝛽9 + 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ
+ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽6 + (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 )×𝑅⃑𝑡 𝛽7 + 𝑅⃑𝑡 𝛽8 + 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚
The subscripts i and t denote player and year respectively. Thus, log(𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ) is the natural log of the
pay for a specific player i in year t. Salary data comes predominately from the Lahman database,
supplemented by Baseball Reference.18 As mentioned earlier, W is our metric of performance, as
measured by WAR. Salary decisions are made before observing a worker’s real performance
(Lazear and Oyer, 2009). Decision makers must rely on observable features when deciding a
player’s salary—the most salient feature being previous performance and thus, we include the
WAR of the previous season. We also include the square of the WAR from the previous season
to allow the relationship between salary and WAR to depend on the level of WAR. Salary
decisions also rely on the scarcity of top performers, for this reason we also include a binary
variable which has the value 1 if we characterize the players as a top performer (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1).
Any one salary decision is made in the broader context of the entire payroll of a division,
department, or work group. To incorporate a measure of team budget, we include the opening
day payroll of the player’s team (Yi,t-1) in the previous year—however, opening team payroll is
just a proxy for the team’s payroll budget.19 Another team level impact is the luxury tax (if it is

18

Lahman Database: http://www.seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/statistics/. Accessed September, 2016.
For the 1984 to 1997 seasons, we use Baseball Chronology (http://www.baseballchronology.com/Baseball/) and
for the 1998 to 2015 seasons, we use Steve the Ump’s dataset (http://www.stevetheump.com/Payrolls.htm).
19
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in effect in the given time period)—𝑅⃑𝑡 is a vector that indicates in which time period the season
is (refer to Table 1). The luxury tax is of larger concern to teams whose budgets approach the
cap. Thus, in the periods with a luxury tax, we include the difference between the team’s
previous payroll and the salary cap (𝑇𝑡 ) to understand the sensitivity to the cap. For the 1997 to
1999 seasons, we take the 5th highest payroll from the previous season as a proxy for the cap
since this cap depends on being one of the five teams with the highest payroll.
As we indicated in our literature review, Glenn, et al. (2001) found that team specific
knowledge impacted the value of a player to a specific team. To control for this effect, we
include the variable 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 which is the number of years that a player has played with
their current team (whether or not they were consecutive seasons) before season 𝑡. In baseball,
like many other industries, players sign multi-year contracts. A manager may already have a
good amount of her team’s payroll set long before that season. Contracts limit player mobility in
two main ways: (1) MLB only allows players to become free agents after 6 years of major league
service and (2) players can negotiate no-trade clauses into their contract which prevents them
from being traded to another team without their consent. Pedace and Hall (2012) showed that
there is a salary tradeoff for players seeking the risk neutralizing no-trade clause, particularly in
the case of long term contracts. However, because of the challenge in collecting data for which
players are under contracts and which contracts contain no-trade clauses for all years in our
dataset, we cannot include this factor in our analysis. Long term contracts are the exception
rather than the rule—in Pedace and Hall’s (2012) research, the average contract length was 1.8
years in their dataset of 382 free agents. However, this is still a limitation to our work. Blass
(1992) found that salary in baseball increases with number of years, independent of an increase
in performance. To control for this type of effect, we also include a player’s number of years
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since a player’s debut year, (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 )—important to note, how we calculate this variable does
not take into account if a player takes a season off (for example, to serve in the military).
We also realize that certain teams have specific team characteristics that might impact how
they compensate their players. Since we cannot capture every characteristic of every team in a
finite number of variables, we include a binary variable for each team to control for team fixed
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖 ). One reason to
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖,𝑡 ).20 We also include fixed effects for country of birth (𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ
effects (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚
include these fixed effects is that only U.S. and Canadian residents can enter the MLB draft—
thus, the scouting procedure and the resulting contracts can be different for other countries.21
While birth country is only a rough proxy for residency when drafted, country of birth also
accounts for any type of institutional or cultural discrimination that players from a specific
country might experience.
iii. A Regression of Retention on Salary: Salary as a Tool to Retain Top Talent
Salary is also a means by which firms retain workers. A worker who feels undercompensated
and undervalued by his or her firm has higher incentive to look for work elsewhere. As
previously mentioned, this effect is impacted by MLB’s regulation on free agency by requiring
that a player has at least six years of experience in the major leagues before being able to
negotiate his own contract and controls for which team he plays. While six years are required
before being declared a free agent, teams may extend a contract beyond those six years at any
point if the player agrees. Thus, not every player becomes a free agent after the same amount of

20

We use our judgement to discern what type of team changes constitute a new team fixed effect. The Tampa Blue
Rays changed their name from the Tampa Blue Devil Rays to Tampa Blue Rays—we consider this as still one team.
Similarly, when the Florida Marlins changed their name to the Miami Marlins they moved from one part of Miami
to another, however we still include them as one team in the team fixed effects. In contrast, the Montreal Expos
where moved and changed to the Washington Nationals in 2004. Since this change was a major relocation, we
include two team fixed effects—one for the Montreal Expos and another for the Washington Nationals.
21
MLB Draft Information: http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp. Accessed March, 2017.
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time. Whether a free agent remains on a team from one year to the next can be broken into two
decisions: (1) the player’s decision to stay on a specific team and (2) the team’s decision to retain
that player. We are predominately interested in this first decision. In order to analyze this
decision, we look at the decisions of all free agents between seasons from 1985 to 2015
(including between the 2015 and 2016 seasons). We get the data on free agents as well as which
teams they leave and join from Baseball Reference.22 Free agency is not a perfect assessment of
turnover decisions since, as previously mentioned, a player’s contract can be extended before it
expires. If a player is intending to stay at their current team, they may choose to exercise the
ability to extend their contract rather than go up for free agency. In our dataset, 77% of free
agents decide to change teams—this is most likely over representing turnover. Below is our
model of retention decisions under which the dependent variable takes on the value 1 if a player
moves from one team to another between seasons:
Equation 4

𝑷(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 )
= 𝛷(𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽1 +

𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜇̂ 𝑆𝑡−1
𝜎𝑆,𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1

𝛽2 + ln(𝜎𝑆,𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 )𝛽3 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽4

⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 𝛽5 + ⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 𝛽7 + 𝑅⃑𝑡 𝛽8
+ 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 𝛽6 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 ×𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽9 + 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑖,𝑡 𝛽10)
+ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚
This model develops the model introduced in Pedace and Smith (2013) to inlcude WAR as a
measure of performance (instead of a vector of performance characteristics). In contrast to
Pedace and Smith’s (2013) model, we use a probit model instead of a linear probability model
because the range of a probit model better fits the 0 to 1 range of a probability. 𝛷 is the inverse

22

Baseball Reference Free Agency data available, for the 2015 season, at: http://www.baseballreference.com/leagues/MLB/2015-free-agents.shtml. Data for other years easily accessible from this link.
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normal cumulative distribution function. To reflect the literature which claims that pay
dispersion decreases player morale (Bloom, 1999; Debrock et al., 2004; Bruenig et al., 2014; Tao
et al., 2016), our model includes the natural log of the standard deviation of the teams’ payroll
(σP). Since a player who is at the bottom of the pay dispersion on their team will be more
disgruntled than a player who is one of the highest paid players, our model also includes the zscore of a player’s position in the team’s salary dispersion:

̂ 𝑆𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 −𝜇
𝜎𝑆,𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1

. Since we use the z-score

as a measure of how many standard deviations a player’s salary is from the team’s mean salary,
we make no assumption of the distribution of salary beyond a finite standard deviation. Our
model also includes the salary of the player in the previous season as well as the player’s WAR.
If a team has had a strong season, a player is more likely to remain with that team to continue
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 ) that contains the team’s
playing on a strong team. The model includes a vector (𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠
record from the previous season in three values: the team’s win percentage, a binary variable that
is 1 if the team made the playoffs, and another binary variable that is 1 if the team won the
World Series. The data for this vector was contained within the Lahman database.
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑
𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 is a vector that contains two binary variables—one which takes the value of 1 if
there was a mid-season change in management in the previous season and another which takes
the value of 1 if there was a management change between seasons. We include both midseason
and between season management changes separately since a midseason management change
might indicate poor management previously while a between season change might be more
routine. These binaries depict changes in both General Managers and Team Managers.
⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑
𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑡−1 is interacted with a player’s WAR since new management will be more inclined
to remove lower performers from the roster. All data on management changes comes from
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Baseball America’s Executive Database.23 As in our previous model, we include two vectors to
control for team fixed effects from the team which a player leaves and joins as well as a vector
(𝑅⃑𝑡 ) to control for the impact of the different luxury tax regulations and time fixed effects (refer
to Table 1).
V.

Results
In this section, we first discuss the data used in our research and then the results of each of

the three statistical models that we are testing: (i) the number of high performers: an input into
salary decisions; (ii) a regression of salary on performance: the link between performance and
salary; and, (iii) a regression of retention on salary: salary as a tool to retain top talent.
i. Data
Our analysis primarily uses wins above replacement (WAR) as a measurement of
performance and salary data for MLB players from 1985 to 2015. WAR data comes from
Baseball Reference, a sabermetrics site.13 Additional information on the calculation of WAR is
provided in our Methods and Model section. The use of statistics in sports, and specifically
baseball has proliferated in the last two decades (Barnwell 2014; London 2014). In sabermetrics,
WAR has become one of the most widely used metrics—DuPaul (2012) found that the WAR
computed by Baseball Reference very closely predicted winning percentage (with an R2 of .83
and coefficients very close to the theoretical values). However, as DuPaul (2012) notes, there are
skeptics of WAR because of how much the defensive metrics tend to vary from year to year for
most players. While using single-season WAR has its limitations, we believe it is superior to
using a vector of values because of its power in being able to compare players’ marginal
contributions across seasons, eras, and teams. There has been attempts to make WAR metrics for
23

Baseball America’s Executive Database: http://www.baseballamerica.com/execdb/.

34

other sports such as football; however, they face the difficulty of finding the independent
performance of a player in sports that are much more interdependent than baseball (Hughes et al
2015). Both Newman et al. (2015) and Barnes and Bjarandóttir (2016) use WAR as a proxy for
performance.
Salary data primarily comes from the Lahman database, supplemented by the salary data
on Baseball Reference when the Lahman database did not have salary data for a specific player.18
All salaries are measured in 2015 dollars using the annual average of the CPI-U from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.24 Salary data was available for fewer players than WAR. For this reason, the
dataset was restricted to include only those players for whom both WAR and salary data was
available. Table 2 displays summary statistics for WAR under the unrestricted data set, which
includes all WAR data available on Baseball Reference, and the restricted data set, which is
limited to those observations with salary data.

24

The use of the CPI-U instead of the CPI was chosen because baseball teams are exclusively in urban cities and
thus, CPI-U represents the price changes most relevant to baseball players. CPI FRED Dataset:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCNS. Accessed October, 2016.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for WAR under the Restricted and Unrestricted Data Sets
and the 4 Time Periods
Restricted Data Set
Unrestricted Data Set
1985 to 2015
µ = 0.9819
µ = 0.7256
σ = 1.7396
σ = 1.5640
n = 22,731
n = 31,876
min = -3.27 max = 13.25 min = -3.27 max = 13.25
No Regulation I (1985 to 1996)
µ = 1.0245
µ = 0.7792
σ = 1.7496
σ = 1.6179
n = 7,979
n = 10,440
min = -3.07 max = 13.25 min = -3.07 max = 13.25
1996 Luxury Tax (1997 to 1999)
µ = 0.9154
µ = 0.7349
σ = 1.7419
σ = 1.6247
n = 2,605
n = 3,195
min = -3.27 max = 12.15 min = -3.27 max = 12.15
No Regulation II (2000 to 2002)
µ = 0.9963
µ = .7196
σ = 1.7903
σ = 1.5833
n = 2,302
n = 3,353
min = -2.75 max = 11.85 min = -2.75 max = 11.85
2002 Luxury Tax (2003 to 2015)
µ = 0.9615
µ = .6873
σ = 1.7180
σ = 1.5059
n = 9,845
n = 14,888
min = -2.93 max = 10.62 min = -2.93 max = 10.62
Note: Restricted refers players for which both WAR and salary data was available. Unrestricted is all players for
which WAR was available.

Table 3. Magnitude of the Difference in Means and Variance for Between the Restricted
and Unrestricted Dataset of WAR
Difference in Means
Difference in Variances
1985 to 2015
.2563
.1756
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996)
.2453
.1317
(2) 1996 Luxury Tax (1997 to 1999) .1805
.1172
(3) No Regulation II (2000 to 2002) .2767
.2070
(4) 2002 Luxury Tax (2003 to 2015) .2742
.2121
Note: Difference is calculated as the value of the unrestricted dataset requested from the restricted dataset.

As evident in Table 2 and 3, excluding the players that do not have salary data skews the
summary statistics of our sample to the right. Players with lower WARs are systematically more
likely to not have salaries reported in our dataset. To understand this impact more, we ran
statistical inference tests that tested for the difference of means and the difference of variances.
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To test for the difference of means, we used the nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test under
the null that the mean of the WAR for players with salary data was the same as those without
(Wilcoxon, 1945). To test for the difference of variances, we used the nonparametric Levene’s
Test defined with the median25 under the null that the variance of WAR for players with salary
data was the same as those without (Levene, 1960). Each test was conducted for each of the four
periods. The results of these tests are in Table 4—all the tests showed a significant difference
between the means and variances of the two samples at the 1% significance level. Thus, salary
information is not randomly missing. There is a bias in which players have missing salary data
towards those with low WARs. While we cannot control for which salary data is reported or not,
this effect may impact our results.
Table 4. Comparing Restricted and Unrestricted Datasets
Time Period
Wilcoxon Rank Sum
p-value Levene’s Test Statistic
Test for Difference of
for Difference of
Means (W)
Variance (L)
(1) No Regulation I
30.472
0.0000
1,579.65
(1985 to 1996)
(2) 1996 Luxury
14.568
0.0000
458.64
Tax (1997 to 1999)
(3) No Regulation
14.473
0.0000
512.53
II (2000 to 2002)
(4) 2002 Luxury
28.095
0.0000
2,459.89
Tax (2003 to 2015)

p-value

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Figure 4 depicts the summary statistics of our two main variables of interest: salary and
WAR for the four time periods in question. While the summary statistics of WAR do not change
much over the four time periods, there is a clear trend in salary in which average salary, as well
as the overall dispersion of salary, increases.

25

Our conclusions do not change if we had used the Levene’s test defined by the mean or trimmed mean.
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Figure 4. Summary Statistics of Restricted Data Set for the Four Time Period
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In our third model, we look specifically at players who go up for free agency after the
seasons of 1985 to 2015. We get the data for players who are up for free agency from Baseball
Reference.22 We link this dataset to our data on WAR and salary in order to analyze how salary
decisions on the part of the previous team influences a player’s turnover decision which results
in 3,830 observations. As mentioned previously, our dataset most likely over represents turnover
decisions because of players’ and teams’ ability to extend contracts.
ii. The Results of the Number of High Performers: An Input into Salary Decisions
We defined the empirical survival function of W (our random variable for performance as
measured by WAR) in our model section. On their own, the empirical survival functions are not
very enlightening in regards to the underlying distribution. To understand the underlying
distribution for performance, we consider the log-log and semi-log plots of the survival function.
Figure 5 shows the log-log plots for our dataset. These would be linear if the underlying
distribution was Pareto distributed but these plots are not linear. Figure 6 shows the Hill plot for
each of the four periods. A Hill plot shows the Hill estimator (Hill, 1975) for the inverse of the
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parameter of a power law distribution which is a function of the order statistic. For data with an
underlying power law distribution, the Hill plot should stabilize around the value of the estimate.
As evident in Figure 6, the Hill plot does not stabilize and instead produces Hill “Horror” plots
of an estimator gone awry (Resnick, 2007). These plots provide further evidence that W does not
have a power law distribution. This finding is contrary to previous literature of a broad variety of
industries (Rosen, 1981; Mizuno et al., 2012; O’Boyle and Aguinis, 2012; Aguinis and O’Boyle,
2014; Aguinis et al, 2016).
Figure 5. Log-log plots of the empirical survival function of W evaluated at dummy
variable 𝒙 against 𝒙 to test for the power law distribution
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Figure 6. Hill plots to estimate the parameter of a power law distribution
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After having evidence that W is not heavy tailed, we turn to non-heavy tailed
distributions. Figure 7 shows the semi-log plots of the log of the empirical survival function for

W evaluated at dummy variable 𝑥 against 𝑥 2 —this plot should be linear if W is normally
distributed. Figure 8 shows the empirical survival function of W evaluated at 𝑥 plotted against 𝑥.
These plots should be linear if the underlying distribution is exponential. The strong linearity of
Figure 8 shows strong evidence that W is exponentially distributed despite the slight linearity in
part of Figure 7.
Figure 7. Semi-log plots of the log of the empirical survival function for W evaluated at
dummy variable 𝒙 against 𝒙𝟐 to test for normality
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Figure 8. Semi-log plots of the log of the empirical survival function of W evaluated
at dummy variable 𝒙 against 𝒙 to test for exponential distribution

Some might ask about the noise in the right tails of Figure 8. Because of a low probability
of drawing from the right tail of an exponential distribution, a small number of observations can
cause a deviation from linearity. For example, Figure 9 shows a semi-log plot for a random
sample from an exponential distribution with parameter 1. In contrast, Figure 10 shows a semilog plot for a random sample from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Even when the sample is from a true exponential distribution, there can be random variation.
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Figure 9. Semi-log plot of the log of the empirical survival function evaluated at 𝒙
against 𝒙 for a random sample from an exponential distribution

Figure 10. Semi-log plots of the log of the empirical survival function evaluated at 𝒙 against
𝒙𝟐 of a random sample from a normal distribution

Once we have narrowed down the underlying distribution of our data, we can compute
the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for the parameter of an exponential distribution for
each of the four periods. For a random variable X distributed exponentially with parameter λ and
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a random sample, the MLE is λ̂ = 1/𝑥̅ where 𝑥̅ is the sample average of the random sample.26
Table 5 shows the MLE estimator of λ. Objectively, the periods with a luxury tax have a larger
parameter than those without.
Table 5. MLE Estimator for the Distribution of Performance
Period
Parameter Estimate
All Periods (1985 to 2015)
λ̂ = 1.0184
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996)
λ̂ = 0.9760
(2) 1996 Luxury Tax (1997 to 1999)
λ̂ = 1.0923
(3) No Regulation II (2000 to 2002)
λ̂ = 1.0036
(4) 2002 Luxury Tax (2003 to 2015)
λ̂ = 1.03625

To understand the impact of the luxury tax on the distribution of performance, we can
consider the individual distributions for each of the four periods. We use the Wilcoxon Rank
Sum statistic (Wilcoxon, 1945) to test for whether the periods with the two different luxury taxes
are significantly different from those without any luxury tax or if the difference in the parameter
estimate occurred by chance. Table 6 shows the Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic for the two periods
without a luxury tax and for each of the periods with a luxury tax compared to the periods
without. The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the two groups is the same.
Table 6. Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Statistic to Test the Impact of the Luxury Tax
Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Periods for Comparison
p-value
Statistic
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996) against (3)
1.353
.1761
No Regulation II (2000 to 2002)
𝑛1 = 7,979; 𝑛2 = 2,302
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996) and (3)
3.096
.0020
No Regulation II (2000 to 2002) against (2)
1996 Luxury Tax (1997 to 1999)
𝑛1 = 10,605; 𝑛2 = 2,698
(1) No Regulation I (1985 to 1996) and (3)
2.441
.0146
No Regulation II (2000 to 2002) against (4)
2002 Luxury Tax (2003 to 2015)
𝑛1 = 10,605; 𝑛2 = 10,162
26

The sample average is the sum of the data points divided by the number of data points.
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We cannot reject the null that the data for the two periods without a luxury tax come from
the same distribution. Assuming that they both come the same distribution, we continue to
compare both period 2 and period 4 to this combined data of the two periods without a luxury
tax. The test statistic rejects the null that they come from the same distribution for both period 2
(at the 1% level) and period 4 (at the 5% level). These results suggest that the distribution of
performance under either of the luxury tax regimes is different at a statistically significant level
from that under no luxury tax.
We define top performers to be those who have WAR more than two standard deviations
from the mean of the overall dataset. The mean of our overall dataset is .9819 and using the
overall MLE estimator, the standard deviation is also .9819 which means that any player with a
WAR strictly above 2.94 is designated as a top performer. We use the MLE estimator to get the
standard deviation because the estimator is based on the sample mean which is a more stable
estimate than the standard deviation. To get a general idea of magnitude and possible economic
significance, the probability of being a top performer in period 1 is 5.67% (assuming the MLE
parameter estimated in Table 6). Comparably, the chance of a random player being above that
same WAR in period 2 is 4.02% and in period 4, 4.75% (also assuming the MLE parameter).
Assuming a binomial distribution and 30 MLB teams each with a roster of 25 players, these
findings result in an average of 43 top performers per season in period 1, 30 top performers in
period 2, and 36 top performers in period 4. The periods with a luxury tax had on average 7 to 13
fewer high performers (assuming equivalent number of teams).27
In comparison to a Pareto distribution, the light tail of an exponential means that the
farther one gets from the mean and into the tail, the less likely to find observations. So, a top

27

Teams were added in the period we are analyzing; however, for comparison purposes, we assume the number of
teams in MLB at the end of our period—thirty teams.
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performer is on average less common when the underlying distribution is exponential than when
the distribution is Pareto. Using basic supply and demand theory, the decreased supply of top
performers should make them more scarce and thus, able to demand a wage premium in the labor
market. The larger the parameter for an exponential (as we found for the two periods with a
luxury tax), the less likely it is to find observations in the tail and the scarcer these top
performers become.
Another question raised by these results is why top performers are less common in years
with the luxury tax. Traditional wage theory suggests that pay is set at the marginal value of a
worker to the company or at a market rate below that marginal value and does not consider the
impact of wage on worker performance. Another theory is that of efficiency wages which
indicates that under certain conditions, an increase in wages increases productivity because the
increase in wages increases motivation (Yellen, 1995; Akerlof, 1984; Stiglitz, 1976). In this
situation, we might be seeing the effect of the opposite—the luxury tax may be decreasing the
salaries of high performers and thus, these players similarly decrease their effort. This type of
mechanism may be triggered because the luxury tax impacts the entire labor market—in the
traditional model, if a worker is dissatisfied with wages, she would switch to another firm.
However, in the situation of the luxury tax, all the teams may be impacted (or all the teams that
can pay large salaries). To explore this relationship more, in our next section of results, we will
look at how performance is translated into salary in each of the four periods we are considering.
ii. The Results of a Regression of Salary on Performance: The Link between
Performance and Salary
Using the definition of a top performer from the previous section, we ran the regression
in Equation 3. The results are displayed in Table 7. Model 5 and Model 6, which include fixed
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effects for year, period, team, and country of birth, both explain 58% of variation in the natural
log of salary—the difference between these two models are their functional form. Model 6
includes a squared term for the lag of WAR. We do not interpret the impact of a change in WAR
under Model 6 because of the lack of significance of the WAR squared coefficient. While the
addition of the square term changes the coefficient value of the Star binary, the values for the
other control variables do not significantly change.
In our linear model (model 5), a 1 unit increase in WAR in one season leads to a 21.4%
increase in salary in the next. While this increase in WAR is by no means small, it is an
attainable increase in performance for a player from one season to the next. This shorthand
calculation assumes that the change in WAR does not place the player over the 2.94 cut off by
which we define a superstar—for a player whose WAR is above 2.94, his salary is boosted by
15.0% to 16.0% (depending on whether using model 5 or model 6, respectively). The high
statistical significance as well as economic significance of this coefficient indicates that a player
does get an additional benefit from being a rare, high performing player.
In Model 7, we added an interaction term between the lag of WAR and period of
regulation. The interactions terms for both period 2 and period 3 are statistically insignificant
while the interaction term for period 4 is statistically significant and negative. Thus, per our
model the change in salary is 2.1% lower in period 4 than in period 1 for a one unit increase in
WAR. These results indicate that when controlling for all the other factors in our model, high
performance was less rewarded since the 2002 luxury tax. This finding supports our rationale in
the preceding sub-section that efficiency wages could be a mechanism by which the luxury tax is
impacting performance. Since 2002, players are less financially rewarded for an increase in
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performance and thus, they are less motivated to perform highly. This decrease in motivation is
reflected in the lower percentage of top performers in period 4.
Our results also indicate a relationship between tax regime and overall team payroll.
Team payroll is only significant in our models until we add in team fixed effects indicating that
the same teams consistently have higher payroll budgets. Our model also indicates that under
period 2 (the 1996 luxury tax), teams were more responsive to their total payroll proximity to the
tax taking effect than in period 4. For example, using Model 5,28 being $10 million closer to
when the tax might take effect in period 2 led to a 2.7% decrease in salary while in period 4, that
same increase in payroll lead to a .75% decrease in salary.29 This result may reflect the structure
of the two different tax regimes—because of the uncertainty in when the tax goes into effect
under the 1996 luxury tax, teams may be a little more conservative with their payroll. The 1996
luxury tax also did not have a progressive tax scheme depending on the numbers of years in
violation. Thus, the tax penalty faced was higher in the first year of violation under the 1996
luxury tax than under the 2002 luxury tax.
While not the focus of this paper, our results also confirm the importance of team specific
knowledge and major league playing experience. Like Glenn, et al.’s (2001) conclusions which
reinforce the importance of team specific knowledge, our models find a 6.3% to 7.1% increase in
salary for each additional year with the same team. Our model predicts a 14.7% to 14.9%
increase in salary per year of major league playing experience which is similar to the findings of
Blass (1992) which found that salary and years of experience are positively correlated.

28

The general magnitude of these results does not change in Model 5-7.
One of the main attributes of the 1996 luxury tax is that teams face uncertainty of when the tax will take effect
because only the five teams with the highest payroll face the tax.
29
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VARIABLES

Table 7. Regression Results for Model 2: Natural Log of Salary against lag of WAR
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6

WAR Squared
WAR

0.299***
(0.00760)

0.217***
(0.00609)

0.217***
(0.00581)

0.216***
(0.00580)

0.214***
(0.00576)

-0.00172
(0.00122)
0.221***
(0.00816)

0.111***
(0.0372)

-0.217***
(0.0100)

0.156***
(0.0291)
0.0632***
(0.00329)
0.149***
(0.00196)
0.00386***
(0.000389)
0.00271***
(0.000635)
0.00483***
(0.000141)
-1.587***
(0.0284)

0.148***
(0.0275)
0.0686***
(0.00315)
0.148***
(0.00186)
0.000408***
(0.000152)
-0.00394***
(0.000808)
-0.00186***
(0.000277)
-1.963***
(0.0355)

0.150***
(0.0275)
0.0703***
(0.00316)
0.147***
(0.00186)
0.000211
(0.000152)
-0.00285***
(0.000839)
-0.000865***
(0.000305)
-1.977***
(0.0469)

0.150***
(0.0274)
0.0715***
(0.00317)
0.148***
(0.00186)
0.000188
(0.000154)
-0.00271***
(0.000836)
-0.000751**
(0.000301)
-2.002***
(0.0464)

0.160***
(0.0277)
0.0714***
(0.00317)
0.148***
(0.00187)
0.000188
(0.000154)
-0.00271***
(0.000836)
-0.000753**
(0.000301)
-2.002***
(0.0464)

0.221***
(0.00694)
0.0110
(0.0101)
0.00877
(0.0110)
-0.0213***
(0.00740)
0.153***
(0.0274)
0.0715***
(0.00317)
0.148***
(0.00186)
0.000180
(0.000152)
-0.00253***
(0.000847)
-0.000812***
(0.000301)
-2.010***
(0.0469)

20,112
0.198

19,982
0.525

19,982
0.569
YES

19,982
0.573
YES
YES

19,982
0.580
YES
YES
YES

19,982
0.580
YES
YES
YES

19,982
0.581
YES
YES
YES

Interaction of WAR & Per. 2
Interaction of WAR & Per. 3
Interaction of WAR & Per. 4
Star Binary
Team Experience
Experience
Team Payroll (in millions)
Distance btw Payroll and Tax
(Per. 2)
Distance btw Payroll and Tax
(Per. 4)
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Time and Period FE
Team FE
Birth Country FE

(7)
Model 7

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are lag variables (besides salary, the dependent variable).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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iv. The Results of a Regression of Retention on Salary: Salary as a Tool to Retain
Top Talent
In our third model, we want to understand how the luxury tax might be impacting
turnover decisions of players and thus, talent retention. The results of our regression from
Equation 4 are displayed in Table 8. The probit estimates for the coefficients for salary are not
consistent across our different models nor are they statistically significant in Model 4 and 5, the
two models which we include both time and team fixed effects. Our results similarly do not
support the statistical significance of the natural log of the standard deviation of team salary. The
z-score did prove to be statistically significant in our model. The coefficient’s positive sign
indicates that individuals who were higher in the salary dispersion of a team were more likely to
change teams when they went up for free agency. This result most likely reflects the tendency of
teams to extend top performers’ contracts if they want to retain them (and if the top performer
similarly wants to remain with his team)—if a top performer becomes a free agent, other teams
might try to negotiate an attractive enough salary to have him leave his previous team.
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Table 8. Regression Results for Model 3: Probit Model of Turnover against Salary
VARIABLES
Salary (in millions)

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4

(5)
Model 5

0.0176**
(0.00797)

-0.0438***
(0.0151)
0.323***
(0.0409)
0.211***
(0.0466)

-0.0282*
(0.0155)
-0.0557
(0.0781)
0.162***
(0.0482)

-0.0243
(0.0155)
-0.0222
(0.0972)
0.155***
(0.0488)

0.700***
(0.0291)

-0.168***
(0.0232)
0.420***
(0.123)
0.673***
(0.0348)

-0.161***
(0.0263)
0.435***
(0.124)
-0.467
(0.386)

-0.164***
(0.0268)
0.458***
(0.126)
-0.499
(0.435)

-0.0212
(0.0219)
-0.0304
(0.101)
0.124**
(0.0530)
0.198*
(0.108)
0.00691
(0.0977)
0.0105
(0.0826)
-0.164***
(0.0268)
0.454***
(0.126)
-0.508
(0.435)

3,830

3,830

3,830
YES

3,830
YES
YES

3,830
YES
YES

Ln of Std Dev of Team Salary
Z-score of Salary of Team
Z-score interacted with Period 2
Z-score interacted with Period 3
Z-score interacted with Period 4
WAR
Star Binary

Constant
Observations
Time and Period FE
Team FE

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are of season leading up to free agency.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 5 included interaction variables of the z-score of a player with the period of luxury
tax regulation. While for period 3 and 4 the coefficients on these interactions were not
statistically significant, the coefficient for period 2 was statistically significant and indicates that
players in period 2 were more likely to leave their previous team if they went up for free agency
than in the other periods. When analyzing this finding in the context of our previous results, it
seems challenging to understand how the higher turnover in period 2 might combine with our
findings in subsection ii that periods with the luxury tax had less top performers. One potential
explanation is that in period 2 teams may have reacted to the luxury tax by not extending the
contract of high earning players. Therefore, these players went on to obtain free agency and
switch teams. These high earning players, who presumably also had a high amount of talent,
were less motivated to perform highly in order to ensure team retention. This mechanism is
unlike the one by which teams rewarded high performers less as we found in period 4 in our
previous subsection.
While this result does not address a team’s ability to retain top talent, it does address if a
team would want to retain top talent. The immediate answer to this question might seem
obviously positive but our results indicate that teams in period 2 may have seen the marginal
value of retaining top talent as less than the salaries these teams could negotiate with that talent.
However, why might this behavior have been different in period 2 (1996 luxury tax) than in
period 4 (2002 luxury tax)? As we have mentioned previously, the largest difference between the
two luxury taxes is the fixed cap under the 2002 regime. After this fixed cap, teams pay the
penalty compared to the stochastic cap under the 1996 regime under which only the 5 teams with
the highest payroll had to pay the penalty. Our previous subsection suggested that teams are
more responsive to being close to where the tax might take effect in period 2. These results
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suggest that under the 1996 luxury tax, teams navigated the uncertainty of the cap by shying
away from high earning players and allowing those players to enter free agency and leave their
team. In contrast, teams may have been able to more intentionally plan their payrolls since 2003
to make sure they did not incur the penalty or only incurred the penalty to the level with which
they were comfortable. In this period, teams would have controlled their total payroll and the
level of the tax that they pay by adjusting salary level (as indicated in our previous subsection).
VI.

Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of luxury tax on talent retention of top performers.

To answer our question of how talent retention has varied from periods with and without a
luxury tax in place, we quantified the probability of being a top performer in each period using
distribution analysis and we analyzed two regression models of how players were rewarded
using salary and of players’ turnover and retention decisions. In our analysis, data was our
largest limitation. Our information on salary restricted our dataset and skewed our WAR data.
Because the omission tended to be at lower WAR values, we might have overestimated the
probability of high performers and the omission also may have impacted our regressions;
however, because the bias was the same in each period, it should not have impacted the statistical
tests of the difference between periods. The difficulty in collecting data on contract specifics
such as extensions, no-trade clauses, and contract length also limited the impact of our results.
The turnover data for our third model was also a limitation—because of the nature of baseball
contracts, our analysis of free agents did not capture many of the retention decisions as teams
and players extended contracts instead of becoming free agents. Future research could try to
collect data on when players extend contracts and for how long as a component of analyzing
talent retention.
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The literature widely concludes that the distribution of performance is heavy-tailed
(Rosen, 1981; Mizuno et al., 2012; O’Boyle and Aguinis, 2012; Aguinis and O’Boyle, 2014;
Aguinis et al, 2016). Our findings contradict this literature and find a light tailed distribution for
individual performance in MLB. O’Boyle and Aguinis (2012) also considered professional
athletes and MLB in their analysis. For MLB, they considered career strike outs and career home
runs as performance metrics and O’Boyle and Aguinis demonstrated that a Pareto distribution
better fits the data than a normal.30 O’Boyle and Aguinis did not consider an exponential
distribution and thus, leaving out this comparison may have impacted their results. There also
may be a difference between performance as measured by individual metrics and the moreencompassing WAR. For example, if Buster Posey of the San Francisco Giants hits another
home run when a game is at the bottom of the eighth inning and the Giants are already up 6-2,
his home run does not substantially contribute to the Giants win. Further, one could argue that
hitting a home run when your team is already in the lead is easier since there is less pressure.
One of the benefits of WAR is that it roughly attributes the winning percentage of a specific
team to the players on that team. This may demonstrate both one of the weaknesses and strengths
of WAR—ultimately, a higher performing player gets wins for his team; however, a team may
be willing to pay more for a higher certainty of a specific number of wins. For example, two
players may cause the same number of wins but one by a larger margin than the other. Logically,
the certainty of the higher margin of safety may lead to a wage premium for that player.
Future research could study whether performance in other professional sports and
industries is also similarly light tailed when using a metric of marginal impact. In baseball, it is
relatively easy to use a statistic such as WAR that measures the marginal impact of players’

Aguinis and O’Boyle (2012) also considered manager career wins in MLB, though the analysis was more to look
at the performance of coaches than individual players.
30
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performance because of the relative independence of individual performance while developing a
similar statistic may be more complicated for other industries. Specifically, other scenarios in
which group performance more directly impacts the bottom line than individual performance,
metrics such as WAR may be a more accurate measure of the value-add to a firm of a worker’s
performance. Trying to find similar statistics for other situations may enlighten why we found a
light tailed distribution in professional baseball using WAR.
With regards to the luxury tax, we found that there were fewer top performers in the
periods with a luxury tax in place. Since it is unlikely that the underlying talent landscape has
changed, we assume that players are less motivated to perform highly. An alternate assumption
that we do not pursue is that all players improve in the periods with luxury tax and thus, it is
more challenging to become a top performer in these periods—more research would have to be
done in order to support or debunk either assumption. We answered the question of why players
may have had a decrease in motivation in our two regression models. Under the 1996 luxury tax,
we found that players were more likely to leave their team when they went up for free agency
when they were at the higher end of the salary distribution of their team. We concluded that
teams may be less likely to extend the contract of these players as a mitigation technique for the
luxury tax because of the uncertainty around the tax penalty. This theory was supported by the
greater responsiveness in period 2 to the luxury tax that was demonstrated in our second model.
In comparison, under the 2002 luxury tax, we found that increases in performance were less
highly rewarded when compared to previous seasons. We understand our findings using
efficiency wage theory—because the reward, either as retention in subsequent seasons or as
salary, of high performance was lower in periods with a luxury tax in place, players were less
motivated to perform highly.
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Our research substantially contributes to sports economics literature by being the first
empirical study into how the luxury tax has impacted talent retention decisions. Even though
MLB is unique in that the budget constraint impacted the entire industry (at least in the U.S.), we
believe our results also have interesting insights into the talent retention strategies of firms. Our
findings suggest that when a budget constraint is fixed, managers respond by rewarding
performance less with salary. When a budget constraint is stochastic, managers respond by not
rehiring high earners (who may also be high performers) and letting them go. Though not every
industry has a contract system like baseball, one could compare the decision to offer another
contract (normally at a higher salary) as similar to the decision to accept when an individual
comes up for a promotion. Firms need to be cognizant of the impact of the budget constraints
that managers face and how they might impact talent performance as well as talent drain through
turnover.
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